IN THE SPECIAL COURT FOR CBI AT GREATER BOMBAY

BAIL APPLICATION NO. 54 OF 2018

Ashok Chandrej Singh …Applicant/Accused.

Versus

The State (CBI, EOW, Mumbai) ..Respondent

CORAM : HIS HONOUR JUDGE SHRI S.R. TAMBOLI (COURT ROOM NO.47)

DATED : 22.01.2018

SPP Mr. J.K. Sharma for the CBI, EOW.

Advocate Mr. Tarak Sayyad and Pathak for the applicant/accused.

ORDER

1.  In the instant application, accused has prayed for bail under Section 167(2) and Section 439 of the Cr. P. C.

2.Ld. Counsel for the applicant/accused submitted that the accused has been arrested in connection with FIR No. RC0682017E0014 lodged by the CBI, EOW, Mumbai for the offences punishable under Section 120(B) read with Sections 420, 465, 467, 468 and 471 of the IPC. The accused had obtained loan from the Central Bank of India. He gave letter of settlement to the bank. In order to give counter blow to the said letter, FIR came to be filed. In fact, accused is innocent. He prayed for bail on various grounds. I will deal with it later one by one.

3. Per­ Contra, Ld. SPP for the CBI, EOW submitted that the present accused and his son submitted false income tax returns, balance sheet and obtained overdraft facility of 2 Cr. The son of the accused obtained overdraft facility under cent trade scheme for the amount of Rs. 2.75 Cr.,

cash credit of Rs. 2.25 Cr, overdraft of Rs. 5 Cr. and term loan of Rs. 5 Cr. The accused and his son produced fake documents like income tax returns, balance sheet, etc. They produced over­valuation of the property. In all they obtained the amount of Rs. 17 Cr. On the date of the filing of the FIR,

the amount of Rs. 33,52,78,253.43 is due from the accused and his son. At the time of the opening of this amount, accused submitted fake and fabricated documents. They committed fraud by over valuation of the collateral security. The accused has diverted funds through various forms.

It shows the conspiracy of the accused no. 1 with other persons as well as officer of the bank. After completion of the investigation, chargesheet is filed for the offences punishable under Section 120­B read with Sections 406, 409, 420, 465, 467, 468 and 471 of the IPC and Section 13(2) r/w

13(I)(d) of the PC A ct. There is a strong prima facie case against the accused. Investigation as per Section 173(8) of the Cr. P. C. is going on. The accused has not given details about the manner in which he diverted the funds. Some fund has been diverted in the name of the employees of this accused. There is a possibility of influencing the witness. Hence, he prayed to reject the application.

4.Now this court will deal with the grounds raised by the accused one by one. Default bail as per Section 167(2) of the Cr. P.C. Ld. Counsel for the accused submitted that though the investigating officer has filed the chargesheet within 90 days, this court has not taken cognizance after filing of the chargesheet till the date of the arguments on the bail application. Therefore, accused is entitled for default bail as per Section 167(2) of the Cr. P.C.

5.To support his contention, he placed reliance on the following decisions:­

i) Pradesh @ Pintya Dinanath Pisat and Anr. Vs. State of Maharashtra in Criminal application No. 1419/92 decided on 07.07.1992.

ii)Vijay Baban Babar Vs. State of Maharashtra in Criminal application No. 303/92 decided on 04.03.1992.

iii) Javed Qureshi Vs. Stte of Maharashtra in Criminal Appeal No. 2005/1992 decided on 04.08.1992.

iv) Joaquim M. Correia Vs. State of Goa in Criminal Application no. 89/98 decided on 18.07.1998.

6. Relying on aforesaid decisions, Ld. Counsel for the accused submitted that as the court has not taken cognizance after filing of the chargesheet. Therefore, the custody of the accused has become illegal and accused is entitled for bail as per Section 167(2) of the Cr. P.C.

7. Per­Contra, Ld. SPP for the CBI, EOW submitted that the investigating officer has filed the chargesheet within 90 days. Section 167(2) of the Cr. P.C. does not speak about taking of the cognizance. Once chargesheet is filed accused has no right for default bail as per Section 167

(2) of the Cr. P. C.

8.Admittedly, in the present case charge­sheet is filed within 90 days from the date of the arrest of the accused. After chargesheet is filed in the City Civil Court, it require some time for assignment from the Hon’ble Principal Judge. The chargesheet also requires scrutiny of the papers and the documents by office. Therefore, failure of the court to take cognizance quickly does not give rights to the accused for bail.

9.The view of this court gets support from the decision of the Hon’ble  Apex Court. It is delivered in the case of Suresh Kumar Bhikamchand Jain vs. State of Maharashtra and Anr.,MANU/SC/0196/2013. In said case Hon’ble Apex Court observed as under:­

“18. None of the said cases detract from the position that once a charge­ sheet is filed within the stipulated time, the question of grant of default bail or statutory bail does not arise. As indicated hereinabove, in our view, the filing of charge­sheet is sufficient compliance with the provisions of Section 167(2)(a)(ii) in this case. Whether cognizance is taken or not is not material as far as Section 167 Code of Criminal Procedure is concerned. The right which may have accrued to the Petitioner, had charge­sheet not been filed, is not attracted to the facts of this case. Merely because sanction had not been obtained to prosecute the accused and to proceed to the stage of Section 309 Code of

Criminal Procedure, it cannot be said that the accused is entitled to grant of statutory bail, as envisaged in Section 167 Code of Criminal Procedure. The scheme of the Code of Criminal Procedure is such that once the investigation stage is completed, the Court proceeds to the next stage, which is the taking of cognizance and trial. An accused has to remain in custody of some court. During the period of investigation, the accused is under the custody of the Magistrate before whom he or she is first produced. During that stage, under Section 167(2) Code of Criminal Procedure, the Magistrate is vested with authority to remand the accused to custody, both police custody and/or judicial custody, for 15 days at a time, up to a maximum period of 60 days in cases of offences punishable for less than 10 years and 90 days where the offences are punishable for over 10 years or even death sentence. In the event, an investigating authority fails to file the charge­sheet within the stipulated period, the accused is entitled to be released on statutory bail. In such a situation, the accused continues to remain in the custody of the Magistrate till such time as cognizance is taken by the Court trying the offence, when the said Court assumes custody of the accused for purposes of remand during the trial in terms of Section 309 Code of Criminal Procedure. The two stages are different, but one follows the other so as to maintain a continuity of the custody of the accused with a court.”

10. In Jeewan Kumar Raut and Anr. vs. Central Bureau of Investigation, MANU/SC/1153/2009, Hon’ble Apex Court observed as under:­

“24. For the views we have taken, we are of the opinion that stricto sensu Sub­section (2) of Section 167 of the Code would not apply in a case of this nature.

Even assuming for the sake of argument that Sub­section (2) of Section 167 of the Code requires filing of a report within 90 days and the complaint petition having filed within the said period, the requirements thereof stand satisfied. 25. Appellant No. 2 having arrested on 10.02.2008 and Appellant No. 1 having surrendered on 17.02.2008 as also the complaint petition having been filed on 29.04.2008, the requirement of Sub­section (2) of Section 167 of the  Code stands satisfied.

In Sanjay Dutt v. State Through C.B.I., Bombay (II) MANU/SC/0554/1994 : 1995CriLJ477 , this Court held: 53(2)(b) The ‘indefeasible right’ of the accused to be released on bail in accordance with Section 20(4)(bb) of the TADA Act read with Section 167(2) of the CrPC in default of completion of the investigation and filing of the challan within the time allowed, as held in Hitendra Vishnu Thakur is a right which enures to, and is enforceable by the accused only from the time of default till the

filing of the challan and it does not survive or remain enforceable on the challan being filed. If the accused applies for bail under this provision on expiry of the period of 180 days or the extended period, as the case may be, then he has to be released on bail forthwith. The accused, so released on bail may be arrested and committed to custody according to the provisions of the CrPC. The right of the accused to be released on bail after filing of the challan, notwithstanding the default in filing it within the time allowed, is governed from the time of filing of the challan only by the provisions relating to the grant of bail applicable at that stage.

Only because the court itself took a long time in taking cognizance of the offence, i.e., after the expiry of the period of 90 days, the same would not mean that any new right would be created in favour of the appellants thereby.

11. In Dinesh Dalmia vs. C.B.I. ,MANU/SC/7924/2007, Hon’ble Apex Court observed as under:­

“29. The statutory scheme does not lead to a conclusion in regard to an investigation leading to filing of final form under Sub­section (2) of Section 173 and further investigation contemplated under Sub­section (8) thereof. Whereas only when a charge sheet is not filed and investigation is kept pending, benefit of proviso appended to Sub­section (2) of Section 167 of the Code would be available to an offender; once, however, a charge sheet is filed, the said right  ceases. Such a right does not revive only because a further investigation remains pending within the meaning of Sub­section (8) of Section 173 of the Code.”

12.The ratio laid down in aforesaid cases clearly shows that the custody of the accused does not become illegal on failure to take cognizance after filing of the chargesheet within 90 days. Hence, this court found no substance in the contention of the Ld. Counsel for the accused. Cases relied

by the counsel of the accused are not helpful to support his contention. No power to grant custody unless cognizance is taken:

13.Ld. Counsel for the accused submitted that after addition of the offences in the PC Act, papers have come before this court. However, prior to that Magistrate has granted custody of the accused beyond the period of 90 days. The magistrate had no power to grant custody beyond the period

of 90 days. Court has not taken cognizance. Custody has been granted beyond the period of 90 days. Therefore, the custody has become illegal.

14.However, the ratio laid down in Suresh Kumar’s Case (Supra.) makes it clear that on submission of charge sheet, the Magistrate is empowered to remand an accused to custody by virtue of powers vested in him under Section 167(2) of the Code and it is only when he takes cognizance that the stage of Section 309(2) of the Code is reached and till then, the remand of the accused can be legally continued by taking resort to the provisions embodied in Section 167(2) of the Code.

15.Moreover, this court has taken cognizance of the offences. This court also issued production warrant to the accused. Therefore, this court found no substance in the contention of the Ld. Counsel for the accused. The accused is innocent person and dispute is civil.

16.Ld. Counsel for the accused submitted that the accused had  obtained loan. He prayed for settlement at once. In order to give counter blow, false complaint has been filed against the accused. There is no prima facie case against the accused.

17.This court has gone through the chargsheet and FIR. It shows that the accused no. 1 is a proprietor of M/s Ashok Property Developers. He obtained overdraft facility of 2 Cr from Central Bank of India in collusion with the officer of the bank. He produced following fake documents:­

i) Income tax returns of year 2009­2010

ii)Income tax returns of year 2010­2011

iii)Income tax returns of year 2011­2012

iv) Balance sheet of M/s Ashok Property Developers as on March 2009

v) Balance sheet of M/s Ashok Property Developers as on March 2010

vi) Balance sheet of M/s Ashok Property Developers as on March 2011

18. Balance sheet seems to be audited by a CA firm namely M/s Kamal Narayan having membership no. 130982. However, the firm bysaid name is in existence at Indore with different membership number and it has stated that their signatures have been forged in income tax documents by the accused.

19.Chargesheet also shows that the son of the accused obtained overdraft facility of 2.75 Cr under cent trade scheme as proprietor of M/s Ashish communication system. He also obtained cash credit limit of Rs. 2.25 Cr., overdraft of Rs. 5 Cr. and term loan of Rs. 5 Cr. For availing the loan facility of Rs 5 Cr. and by way of overdraft of Rs. 5 Cr as a term loan, present accused stood as guarantor. While obtaining the said facility the son of the accused also used forged income tax returns and balance sheet like the present accused. In all facility for the amount of Rs. 15 Cr was  availed by the son of the present accused. Both have used forged documents. It shows prima facie conspiracy between them. The amount has not been used for the purpose for which it was availed. The amount was diverted through such entities which were not in existence. The investigation in that regard is pending as per Section 173(8) of the Cr.P.C.

20.Allegation against the accused shows the strong prima facie case against the accused. Therefore, it is difficult to accept that the complaint was filed in order to give counter blow to the letter of settlement of the accused.

21.In this context, Ld. Counsel for the accused placed reliance on various decisions. He placed reliance on the decision of Hon’ble Apex Court. It is delivered in Sanjay Chandra vs. CBI , MANU/SC/1375/2011. In said case, Hon’ble Apex Court observed as under:­

“14. In bail applications, generally, it has been laid down from the earliest times that the object of bail is to secure the appearance of the accused person at his trial by reasonable amount of bail. The object of bail is neither punitive nor preventative. Deprivation of liberty must be considered a punishment, unless it can be required to ensure that an accused person will stand his trial when called upon. The courts owe more than verbal respect to the principle that punishment begins after conviction, and that every man is deemed to be innocent until duly tried and duly found guilty. From the earliest times, it was appreciated that detention in custody pending completion of trial could be a cause of great hardship. From time to time, necessity demands that some un­convicted persons should be held in custody pending trial to secure their attendance at the trial but in such cases, ‘necessity’ is the operative test. In this country, it would be quite contrary to the concept of personal liberty enshrined in the Constitution that any person should be punished in respect of any matter, upon which, he has not been convicted or that in any circumstances, he should be deprived of his liberty upon only the belief that he will tamper with the witnesses if left at liberty, save in the most extraordinary circumstances. Apart from the question of prevention being the object of a refusal of bail, one must not lose sight of the fact that any imprisonment before conviction has a substantial punitive content and it would be improper for any Court to refuse bail as a mark of disapproval of former conduct whether the accused has been convicted for it or not or to refuse bail to an un­convicted person for the purpose of giving him a taste of imprisonment as  a lesson.

15. In the instant case, as we have already noticed that the “pointing finger of accusation” against the Appellants is ‘the seriousness of the charge’. The offences alleged are economic offences which has resulted in loss to the State exchequer. Though, they contend that there is possibility of the Appellants tampering witnesses, they have not placed any material in support of the allegation. In our view, seriousness of the charge is, no doubt, one of the relevant considerations while considering bail applications but that is not the only test or the factor: The other factor that also requires to be taken note of is the punishment that could be imposed after trial and conviction, both under the Indian Penal Code and Prevention of Corruption Act. Otherwise, if the former is the only test, we would not be balancing the Constitutional Rights but rather “recalibration of the scales of justice.

26. When the undertrial prisoners are detained in jail custody to an indefinite period, Article 21 of the Constitution is violated. Every person, detained or arrested, is entitled to speedy trial, the question is : whether the same is possible in the present case. There are seventeen accused persons. Statement of the witnesses runs to several hundred pages and the documents on which reliance is placed by the prosecution, is voluminous. The trial may take considerable time and it looks to us that the Appellants, who are in jail, have to remain in jail longer than the period of detention, had they been convicted. It is not in the interest of justice that accused should be in jail for an indefinite period. No doubt, the offence alleged against the Appellants is a serious one in terms of alleged huge loss to the State exchequer, that, by itself, should not deter us from enlarging the Appellants on bail when there is no serious contention of the Respondent that the accused, if released on bail, would interfere with the trial or tamper with evidence. We do not see any good reason to detain the accused in custody, that too, after the completion of the investigation and filing of the charge­sheet.”

22.He also placed reliance on the decision of Hon’ble Apex Court. It is delivered in State of Rajasthan, Jaipur vs. Balchand alias Baliay , MANU/SC/0152/1977. In said Case, Hon’ble Apex Court observed as

under:­

“2. The basic rule may perhaps be tersely put as bail, not jail, except where there are circumstances suggestive of fleeing from justice or thwarting the course of justice or creating other troubles in the shape of repeating offences or intimidating witnesses and the like, by the petitioner who seeks enlargement on bail from the court. We do not intend to be exhaustive but only illustrative. 10

3. It is true that the gravity of the offence involved is likely to induce the petitioner to avoid the course of justice and must weigh with us when considering the question of jail. So also the heinousness of the crime. Even so, the record of the petitioner in this case is that, while he has been on bail throughout in the trial court and he was released after the judgment of the High Court, there is nothing to suggest that he has abused the trust placed in him by the court; his social circumstances also are not so unfavourable in the sense of his being a desperate character or unsocial element who is likely to betray the confidence that the court may place in him to turn up to take justice at the hands of the court. He is stated to be a young man of 27 years with a family to maintain. The circumstances and the social milieu do not militate against the petitioner being granted bail at this stage. At the same time any possibility of the abscondence or evasion or other abuse can be taken care of by a direction that the petitioner will report himself before the notice station at Baren once every fortnight.”

23.He also placed reliance on the decision of Hon’ble Bombay High Court. It is delivered in Khemlo Sakharam Sawant vs. State,: MANU/MH/0816/2001.  In said Case, Hon’ble Bombay High Court

observed as under:­

“10. In the present case, although the Investigating Agency has alleged that if the applicant is released on bail, he is likely to tamper with the evidence. This apprehension is totally misplaced, for the simple reason that having regard to the nature of the allegations in the complaint, the crucial evidence is that of the complainant himself. Therefore, in case the applicant, if released on bail, and attempts to bring any pressure on the complainant, that would be a good case for  cancellation of bail, but it will result in miscarriage of justice to keep the applicant in custody on the basis of mere apprehension. It is not necessary for this Court to go into the correctness of the statements recorded by the Investigating Officer for the same will have to be done at the appropriate stage during the trial. For the time being, what is to be seen, is the nature of the offence; and the possibility of the applicant, if released on bail, making any attempt to tamper with the prosecution evidence or witnesses. As observed earlier, the complaint is simpliciter for an offence under section 12 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, and in that connection, necessary evidence has already been recorded by the Investigating Agency. Merely because co­accused is absconding, is not a sufficient ground to refuse bail in such matters especially when the principal offender has not been booked and the applicant is merely charged of abetment. In the circumstances, I have no hesitation in observing that the Sessions Court was clearly in error in refusing bail mainly being influenced  by considerations other than law.”

24.Relying on the ratio laid down in aforesaid cases, Ld. Counsel for the accused submitted that merely offence is serious is not a ground to deny the bail. According to the counsel of the accused it cannot be only factor for considering the application of bail.

25.There cannot be two opinions about the ratio laid down in aforesaid cases. Even, In the case of Sanjay Chandra (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court had, in para 25, observed that

“…..Therefore, in determining whether to grant bail, both the seriousness of the charge and the severity of the punishment should be taken into consideration. The grant or refusal to grant bail lies within the discretion of the Court. The grant of denial is regulated, to a large extent, by the facts and circumstances of each particular case”.

26.So, the case of Sanjay Chandra (supra) is of no assistance to the accused accused. It is important to note that the principle of law is well settled that the law of precedent is not strictly applicable in case of bail to an accused person. The question of bail to each accused has to be considered on the basis of their facts situation. Since long, the law with regard to the grant or refusal of bail is well settled. A court while granting bail has to exercise its discretion in judicious manner and not as a matter of course.

27.In the present case as earlier stated, the accused has used the forged document at the time of the obtaining the facility of the loan from the bank. Accused was well aware about the documents. It was not genuine. Inspite of this, he used and obtained amount from bank. It shows his prima facie intention. He committed offence in cool and calculated manner and caused economic loss to the bank. In such cases, the court has to take into  consideration the gravity of the offence.

28.The view of this court gets support from the decision of Hon’ble Apex In Nimmagadda Prasad vs. Central Bureau of Investigation, MANU/SC/0485/2013, Hon’ble Apex Court observed as under:

“26. Unfortunately, in the last few years, the country has been seeing an alarming rise in white­collar crimes, which has affected the fiber of the country’s economic structure. Incontrovertibly, economic offences have serious repercussions on the development of the country as a whole. In State of Gujarat v. Mohanlal Jitamalji Porwal and Anr. MANU/SC/0288/1987 : (1987) 2 SCC 364 this Court, while considering a request of the prosecution for adducing additional evidence, inter alia, observed as under:

5… The entire Community is aggrieved if the economic offenders who ruin the economy of the State are not brought to book. A murder may be committed in the heat of moment upon passions being aroused. An economic offence is committed with cool calculation and deliberate design with an eye on personal profit regardless of the consequence to the Community. A disregard for the interest of the Community can be manifested only at the cost of forfeiting the trust and faith of the Community in the system to administer justice in an even handed manner without fear of criticism from the quarters which view white collar crimes with a permissive eye unmindful of the damage done to the national economy and national interest….

27. While granting bail, the court has to keep in mind the nature of accusations, the nature of evidence in support thereof, the severity of the punishment which conviction will entail, the character of the accused, circumstances which are peculiar to the accused, reasonable possibility of securing the presence of the accused at the trial, reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being tampered with, the larger interests of the public/State and other similar considerations. It has also to be kept in mind that for the purpose of granting bail, the Legislature has used the words “reasonable grounds for believing” instead of “the evidence” which means the Court dealing with the grant of bail can only satisfy it as to whether there is a genuine case against the accused and that the prosecution will be able to produce prima facie evidence in support of the charge. It is not expected, at this stage, to have the evidence establishing the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.

28. Economic offences constitute a class apart and need to be visited with a different approach in the matter of bail. The economic offence having deep rooted conspiracies and involving huge loss of public funds needs to be viewed seriously and considered as grave offences affecting the economy of the country as a whole and thereby posing serious threat to the financial health of the country.”

29. Further, Hon’ble Apex Court has laid doen various principals for granting bail in Neeru Yadav vs. State of U.P. ,MANU/SC/1208/2014. In said case, the Hon’ble Apex Court observed as under:­

“10. The pivotal issue that emanates for consideration is whether the impugned order passed by the High Court deserves legitimate acceptation and put in the compartment of a legal, sustainable order so that this Court should not interfere with the same in exercise of jurisdiction Under Article 136 of the Constitution of India. In this context, a fruitful reference be made to the pronouncement in Ram Govind Upadhyay v. Sudarshan Singh MANU/SC/0203/2002 : (2002) 3 SCC 598, wherein this Court has observed that grant of bail though discretionary in nature, yet such exercise cannot be  arbitrary, capricious and injudicious, for the heinous nature of the crime warrants more caution and there is greater change of rejection of bail, though, however dependant on the factual matrix of the matter. In the said decision, reference was made to Prahlad Singh Bhati v. NCT, Delhi MANU/SC/0193/2001 : (2001) 4 SCC 280 and the Court opined thus: (a) While granting bail the court has to keep in mind not only the nature of the accusations, but the severity of the punishment, if the accusation entails a conviction and the nature of evidence in support of the accusations.

(b) Reasonable apprehensions of the witnesses being tampered with or the apprehension of there being a threat for the complainant should also weigh with the court in the matter of grant of bail.

(c) While it is not expected to have the entire evidence establishing the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt but there ought always to be a prima facie satisfaction of the court in support of the charge. (d) Frivolity in prosecution should always be considered and it is only the element of genuineness that shall have to be considered in the matter of grant of bail, and in the event of there being some doubt as to the genuineness of the prosecution, in the normal course of events, the accused is entitled to an order of bail.”

30.From the ratio laid down in aforesaid cases, it is clear that consideration of bail in economic offences should not be in the same  footing as of other offences. Moreover, the parameters of the bail as contained in the decision of Neeru Yadav (supra) are the guiding force to consider the bail application under Section 439 Cr.P.C. The Court has to be cautious in granting bail. It is true that liberty of a person must be visualized where the concept of bail is discussed. But at the same time, gravity of the offence cannot be overlooked. In this regard, the observation of the Hon’ble Apex Court cannot be lost sight of. It is reported in Neeru Yadav (supra) at para­16 as under:­

“16. xxx We are not oblivious of the fact that the liberty is a priceless treasure for a human being. It is founded on the bed rock of constitutional right and accentuated further on human rights principle. It is basically a natural right. In fact, some regard it as the grammar of life. No one would like to lose his liberty or barter it for all the wealth of the world. People from centuries have fought for liberty, for absence of liberty causes sense of emptiness. The sanctity of liberty is the fulcrum of any civilized society. It is a cardinal value on which the civilisation rests. It cannot be allowed to be paralysed and immobilized. Deprivation of liberty of a person has enormous impact on his mind as well as body. A democratic body polity which is wedded to rule of law, anxiously guards liberty. But, a pregnant and significant one, the liberty of an individual is not absolute. The society by its collective wisdom through process of law can withdraw the liberty that it has sanctioned to an individual when an individual becomes a danger to the collective and to the societal order. Accent on individual liberty cannot be pyramided to that extent which would bring chaos and anarchy to a society. A society expects responsibility and accountability from the member, and it desires that the citizens should obey the law, respecting it as a cherished social norm. No individual can make an attempt to create a concavity in the stem of social stream. It is impermissible. Therefore, when an individual behaves in a disharmonious manner ushering in disorderly things which the society disapproves, the legal consequences are bound to follow. At that stage, the Court has a duty. It cannot abandon its sacrosanct obligation and pass an order at its own whim or caprice. It has to be guided by the established parameters of law”.

31.After considering all aspects of the matter as the material already placed along with the charge sheet,it prima facie indicates complicity of the accused in the commission of the crime. It is not a case of no evidence  against the accused at all. Accused is actively involved in economic offence as delineated above. The contention of the learned counsel for the accused that involvement is not well conceived. It is untenable. It cannot be said that there is no prima facie case or reasonable ground to believe that the accused has not committed the offence. In these circumstances, when the allegations are supported by material on record and there is a potential of trial being adversely influenced by grant of bail, seriously jeopardising the interest of justice.

32.In this regard, Ld.Counsel for the accused submitted that the offence alleged against the accused is punishable with seven years only. At the most offence under Section 477A of the IPC is attracted.

33. However, in the present case, accused has forged the documents in order to obtain the facility of overdraft and loan in collusion with his son. The amount of Rs. 17 Cr has been availed from the bank. There is prime case for the offence under Section 477 of the IPC alongwith other offence. Further, bank officer is involved in the conspiracy. Therefore, offence under Section 409 is also attracted. It also provide the punishment for imprisonment for life. Hence, it is difficult to accept that only offence under Section 477A of the IPC is attracted. Hence, this court found no substance in the contention of the Ld. Counsel for the accused.

34.Therefore, after taking into consideration the settled proposition of law with regard to the grant/refusal of bail including one reiterated in the case of Sanjay Chandra (supra) and other citations raised by the defence counsel and after taking into consideration the facts and circumstances of the present case, this court is of the considered opinion that there is no just reason to enlarge the accused on bail.

Completion of the investigation

35.Ld. Counsel for the accused submitted that the investigation is completed and chargesheet is filed. There is no need of the accused for further investigation and he prayed to allow the application.

36. Ld. SPP submitted that the offence against the accused is serious, Further additional investigation is going on in regard to the diversion of the fund by the accused. Some funds seems to be diverted in the name of the employee of the accused.

37.As earlier stated, chargesheet shows strong prima facie case against the accused. Accused is involved in huge money transaction and has the potential of influencing the witnesses and other evidence. Considering the gravity of the offence, this court is of the view that this is not a fit case to

release the accused on bail.

38.In economic offences, the Court cannot sit as a silent spectator but must rise to the occasion to consider the effect of such offence upon the society. It has got gravity because it is an economic offence and it has got deep routed consequence upon the society and people at large. The offence alleged against the accused has serious adverse impact on the fabric of the society.

39.In toto, this court is of the opinion that in the larger interest of public and society, the present accused, who is involved in the economic offence and serious consequences deserves no sympathy. The application of the accused is without any merit. Hence, it deserves to be dismissed.

40.In the result, this court pass the following order:­

ORDER

BA 54/18 is hereby dismissed.

(S.R.TAMBOLI)

Special Judge (CBI) Gr. Bombay.  22.01.2018 Dictated on Transcribed on Signed on : 22.01.18 : 23.01.18 : 24.01.18  BA 54/18 18 “CERTIFIED TO BE TRUE AND CORRECT COPY OF THE ORIGINAL  SIGNED JUDGEMENT/ORDER” UPLOAD DATE 24.01.2018 Name of the Judge TIME NAME OF  STENOGRAPHER 4.48 p.m.  Nikita Yogesh Gadgil HHJ Shri S.R. Tamboli (CR No.47) 22.01.18 Date of Pronouncement of Judgement/Order.  Judgement/order signed by P.O on Judgement/order uploaded on 24.01.18 24.01.18